TY  - JOUR
AU  - Blanchard,Olivier Jean
TI  - Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3664
PY  - 1991
Y2  - March 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3664
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3664.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Olivier J. Blanchard
International Monetary Fund
Economic Counsellor and Director
Research Department
700 19th Street, NW
Rm. 10-700
Washington DC, 20431
Tel: 202-623-7825
Fax: 202-623-7271
E-Mail: blanchar@mit.edu
AB  - This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either the search behavior or the skills of the unemployed, and/or the perceptions of firms of such skills. It argues that such models may explain riot only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two decades -an evolution which triggered their development, but many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general.
ER  -