NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence

Olivier Jean Blanchard

NBER Working Paper No. 3664
Issued in March 1991
NBER Program(s):   EFG

This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either the search behavior or the skills of the unemployed, and/or the perceptions of firms of such skills. It argues that such models may explain riot only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two decades -an evolution which triggered their development, but many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general.

download in pdf format
   (218 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (218 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w3664

Published: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 23-3-1, 1991, pp. 277-292. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Blanchard and Summers w2035 Hysteresis in Unemployment
Gertler and Trigari w12498 Unemployment Fluctuations With Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining
Blanchard and Diamond w3387 Ranking, Unemployment Duration, and Wages
Blanchard and Summers Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem
Blanchard and Katz w5822 What We Know and Do Not Know About the Natural Rate of Unemployment
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us