TY  - JOUR
AU  - Panagariya,Arvind
AU  - Rodrik,Dani
TI  - Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3661
PY  - 1991
Y2  - March 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3661
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3661.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Arvind Panagariya
School of International & Public Affairs
Columbia University
E-Mail: Arvind.Panagariya@Columbia.Edu

Dani Rodrik
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-9454
Fax: 617/496-5747
E-Mail: dani_rodrik@harvard.edu
AB  - Uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent years, yet their economic rationale is not strong. We identify and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political motives for excessive protection. First, a free-rider effect may be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff regime than under a regime in which tariffs are allowed to differ. Second, an input-price effect may dampen the enthusiasm of final-goods producers for import protection. Third, a precommitment effect may increase the cost to a future government of protecting favored sectors. None of these arguments provides an unambiguous, airtight case for tariff uniformity. The decision on uniformity has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
ER  -