Safer Driving for a Price: Evidence on Behavior and Habits in Kenyan Minibuses
Road traffic injuries are the leading cause of death among people aged 5–29. Where traffic laws are weakly enforced, it is unclear whether road safety interventions can change behavior. We run a randomized controlled trial among 203 Kenyan minibuses, testing whether an incentive scheme improves safety overall or merely shifts unsafe driving to unmonitored times. Drivers reduce speeding by 29 percent and harsh braking by 13 percent, improving a safety index by 0.096 standard deviations. Labor-supply and earnings effects are modest, with little displacement across times or places. Improvements fade quickly, suggesting lasting change requires sustained enforcement or stronger incentives.
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Copy CitationDavid Schönholzer, Gregory Lane, and Erin M. Kelley, "Safer Driving for a Price: Evidence on Behavior and Habits in Kenyan Minibuses," NBER Working Paper 35394 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w35394.Download Citation
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