Threshold Disclosure in Collective Decisions
Working Paper 34827
DOI 10.3386/w34827
Issue Date
Voting-based collective decisions are typically made either anonymously or publicly. Anonymous voting protects truthful expression but conceals individual behavior; public voting provides information about individual votes, but, when one option is socially stigmatized, it can distort participation and choices. We introduce threshold majority voting, in which voters choose a disclosure threshold determining whether and when their votes are revealed. In an experiment at UC Berkeley on the participation of transgender women in women’s sports, public voting nearly doubles abstention and reduces support for the stigmatized option. Threshold voting eliminates these distortions while revealing one-third of individual votes.
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Copy CitationLuca Braghieri, Leonardo Bursztyn, and Jan Fasnacht, "Threshold Disclosure in Collective Decisions," NBER Working Paper 34827 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w34827.Download Citation