TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Roubini,Nouriel
TI  - Political Cycles in OECD Economies
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3478
PY  - 1990
Y2  - October 1990
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3478
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3478.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Nouriel Roubini
Department of Economics, KMC 7-83
Stern School of Business, New York University
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY  10012
Tel: 212/998-0886
Fax: 212/995-4218
E-Mail: nroubini@stern.nyu.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 1990-12-10
AB  - This paper studies whether the dynamic behavior of GNP growth, unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments. The sample includes the last three decades in 18 OECD economies. We explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles, both of the "opportunistic" and of the "partisan" type. Also, we confront the implication of recent "rational" models with more traditional approaches. Our results can be summarized as follows: a) The "political business cycle" hypothesis, as formulated in Nordhaus (1975) on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data. With the exception of Japan, we also reject by the extension of the "political business cycle" model, with endogenous timing of elections; b) inflation tends to increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result of preelectoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies; (c) we fire evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long-run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the "rational partisan theory" by Alesina (1987); (d) we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output and unemployment.
ER  -