How Globalization Unravels: A Ricardian Model of Endogenous Trade Policy

We study how uneven gains from globalization can endogenously generate protectionism as a political equilibrium. Using U.S. data, we document that regions more exposed to import competition display stronger opposition to globalization, especially among households with little financial wealth, and that firms in trade-exposed sectors sharply increase lobbying expenditures. To interpret these patterns, we develop and quantify a general equilibrium Ricardian model with heterogeneous households, input-output linkages, and endogenous trade policy shaped by voting and lobbying. Distributional shocks reallocate political support among voters, while lobbying propagates through production networks, generating strategic complementarities that sustain protectionism. Calibrated to U.S.-China sectoral data from 1991--2019, the model accounts for rising inequality, declining support for globalization, and key aggregate trends in consumption and trade.