NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle

B. Douglas Bernheim

NBER Working Paper No. 3434*
Issued in September 1990
NBER Program(s):   PE

This paper offers a new explanation of the dividend pizzle, based upon a

model in which firms attempt to signal profitability by distrbuting cash to

shareholders. I assume that dividends and repurchases are identical, except

that dividends are taxed more heavily. Nevertheless, I demonstrate that,

under certain plausible conditions, corporations will pay dividends. Indeed,

some firms will actually pay dividends, and then retrieve a portion of these

payments by issuing new equity (perhaps through a dividend reinvestment

plan), despite the fact that this appears to create gratuitous tax

liabilities. In addition to providing an explanation for the dividend

puzzle, I also derive a number of strong results concerning corporate payout

decisions and government tax policy. Some of these results are surprising.

For example, the relationship between repurchases and firm quality is hump-shaped.

Moreover, despite the fact that a higher dividend tax rate depresses

dividend payments, it does not affect either government revenue or welfare.

*Published: Rand Journal of Eocnomics, Volume 22, No. 4, pp. 455-476 Winter 1991

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