TY  - JOUR
AU  - Polinsky,A. Mitchell
AU  - Shavell,Steven
TI  - Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3429
PY  - 1993
Y2  - October 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3429
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3429.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305
Tel: 650/723-0886
Fax: 650/723-3557
E-Mail: polinsky@stanford.edu

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-3668
Fax: 617/496-2256
E-Mail: shavell@law.harvard.edu
AB  - Some of the costs of enforcing laws are fixed" - - in the sense that they do not depend on the number of individuals who commit harmful acts- -while other costs are "variable"- - they rise with the number of such individuals. This article analyzes the effects of fixed and variable enforcement costs on the optimal fine and the optimal probability of detection. It is shown that the optimal fine rises to reflect variable enforcement costs; that the optimal fine is not directly affected by fixed enforcement costs; and that the optimal probability depends on both types of enforcement costs. 
ER  -