The Private Value of Innovating for the Government

We quantify the private returns to government R&D contracts awarded to firms. We present new evidence that R&D contracts not only finance innovation but also embed an implicit government guarantee of noncompetitive future procurement for the winning R&D contractor. We measure its private value by analyzing stock market reactions to news about R&D contract awards. Using all federal R&D contracts awarded to U.S. publicly traded firms from 1984 through 2015, we find that the average private return on an R&D contract is 19 times its maximum potential revenue. However, returns are highly skewed, with only 7.5% of firms receiving at least one top-quartile contract. Private returns are linked to future production contracts, but only for noncompetitive awards to vertically integrated or large firms. These results suggest that a procurement regime bundling R&D and production contracts enhances value for firms with production capability. We develop a conceptual framework to clarify this innovation policy lever.