NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard

Richard Arnott, Joseph Stiglitz

NBER Working Paper No. 3316 (Also Reprint No. r1552)
Issued in April 1990
NBER Program(s):   PE

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the subsequent sections focuses on a particular market failure.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w3316

Published: Risk, Information and Insurance, edited by Henri Louberge, pp. 91-121. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990.

 
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