Risk Adjusted Deposit Insurance for Japanese Banks

Ryuzo Sato, Rama V. Ramachandran, Bohyong Kang

NBER Working Paper No. 3314
Issued in April 1990
NBER Program(s):Monetary Economics

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Japanese deposit insurance scheme by contrasting the flat insurance rate with a market-determined risk-adjusted rate. The model used to calculate the risk-adjusted rate is that of Ronn and Verrna (1986) . It utilizes the notion of Merton(1977) that the deposit insurance can be based on a one-to-one relation between it and the put option; this permits the application of Black and Scholes(1973) model for the calculation of the insurance rate. The risk adjusted premiums are calculated for the thirteen city banks and twenty-two regional banks. The inter-bank spread in risk-adjusted rates in Japan is found to be as wide as in the United States. But the insurance system is only one component of the safety network for a county's banking system. The difference in the American and Japanese networks is described and its implications for the evaluation of the insurance system is discussed.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w3314

Published: Sato, Ryuzo (ed.) The selected essays of Ryuzo Sato. Volume 2. Production, stability and dynamic symmetry, Economists of the Twentieth Century series. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA: Elgar, 1999.

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