NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Incentive Conflict in the International Regulatory Agreement on Risk-Based Analysis

Edward J. Kane

NBER Working Paper No. 3308 (Also Reprint No. r1651)
Issued in October 1991
NBER Program(s):   ME

Intergovernmental regulatory cooperation is fundamentally cartel behavior and subject to principal-agent conflict. In negotiating the 1988 risk-based capital agreement, most Western officials' unstated goal may arguably be described as postponing the pain of adapting their domestic regulatory schemes to successor officials' watch. They hoped they could buy time by raising book-value capital requirements for Japanese banks. Efficient-market theory indicates that the market value rather than the book value of a bank's capital impacts its funding cost. It also clarifies that restrictions on domestic and foreign bank competition for Japanese deposits unfairly enhance Japanese banks' ability to intermediate that country's massive capital exports.

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Published: "Incentive Conflict in the International Regulatory Agreement on Risk-Based Capital." From Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Research, Volume II, editedby S.G. Rhee and R.P. Chang, pp. 3-21. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1991.

 
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