TY  - JOUR
AU  - Polinsky,A. Mitchell
AU  - Shavell,Steven
TI  - A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3232
PY  - 1991
Y2  - November 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3232
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3232.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305
Tel: 650/723-0886
Fax: 650/723-3557
E-Mail: polinsky@stanford.edu

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-3668
Fax: 617/496-2256
E-Mail: shavell@law.harvard.edu
AB  - An important result in the economic theory of enforcement is that, under certain circumstances, it is optimal for a fine to be as high as possible - to equal the entire wealth of individuals. Such a fine allows the probability of detection to be as low as possible, thereby saving enforcement costs. This note shows that when the level of wealth varies among individuals, the optimal fine generally is less than the wealth of the highest wealth individuals, and may well be less than the wealth of most individuals.
ER  -