An earlier version of this paper circulated under the name “Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions,” a one-page abstract of which appeared in EC 2023. For helpful comments and discussions, the authors thank Itai Ashlagi, Tilman Börgers, Eric Budish, Robert Day, Benjamin Enke, Xavier Gabaix, Nicole Immorlica, Guy Ishai, David Laibson, Jacob Leshno, Irene Lo, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Shengwu Li, Paul Milgrom, Michael Ostrovsky, Assaf Romm, Al Roth, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Ilya Segal, Ran Shorrer, Pete Troyan, Matt Weinberg, Leeat Yariv, Huacheng Yu, and seminar participants at HUJI, Cornell, Harvard, Stanford GSB, WALE 2022, Noam Nisan’s 60th Birthday Conference, the INFORMS Workshop at EC 2022, MATCH-UP 2022, University of Michigan, INFORMS 2022, the 2022 NBER Market Design Meeting, University of Tokyo, UCI, UCSD, the Bellairs Workshop 2023, EC 2023, the 2023 WZB Matching Market Design conference, Microsoft Research, University of Kentucky, Northwestern, and RPI. Zöe Hitzig provided valuable research assistance. Gonczarowski gratefully acknowledges research support by the National Science Foun-dation (NSF-BSF grant No. 2343922), Harvard FAS Inequality in America Initiative, and Harvard FAS Dean’s Competitive Fund for Promising Scholarship; part of his work was carried out while at Microsoft Research. Heffetz gratefully acknowledges research support by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 2968/21), US-Israel Binational Science Foundation (NSF-BSF grant No. 2023676), and Cornell’s Johnson School; part of his work was carried out while visiting Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs. Thomas gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF CCF-1955205, a Wallace Memorial Fellowship in Engineering, and a Siebel Scholar award; parts of his work was carried out while at Princeton and Microsoft Research. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
