TY  - JOUR
AU  - Frank,Richard G.
AU  - Salkever,David S.
AU  - Mitchell,Jean
TI  - Market Forces and the Public Good:  Competition Among Hospitals and Provision of Indigent Care
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3136
PY  - 1989
Y2  - October 1989
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3136
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3136.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Richard Frank
Department of Health Care Policy
Harvard Medical School
180 Longwood Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
Tel: 617/432-0178
Fax: 617/432-1219
E-Mail: frank@hcp.med.harvard.edu

David S. Salkever
UMBC
Department of Public Policy
1000 Hilltop Circle, Public Policy 418
Baltimore, MD  21250
Tel: 410/455-8459
Fax: 410-455-8066
E-Mail: salkever@umbc.edu
AB  - The research presented here focuses on the impact of competitive forces on the provision of social or merit goods by non-profit hospitals. We specifically examine the behavior of altruistic non-profit hospitals in the supply of charity care. The effects of competitive pressures and past charity care provision on the supply of philanthropic donations to nonprofit hospitals are also examined. Empirical models of the supply of donations and charity care are specified and estimated using data on nonprofit hospitals in Florida for the years 1980-1984. The coefficient estimates imply strong income effects in the charity care supply equations. This raises the possibility that competitive pressures and limits on hospital payments, under public insurance programs, may reduce the supply of indigent care. The results from the supply of donations models suggest that philanthropic donations will alleviate the competitive pressures to a small degree.
ER  -