NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness

Alan S. Blinder, Don H. Choi

NBER Working Paper No. 3105
Issued in September 1989
NBER Program(s):   EFG

A small interview survey was undertaken to see how actual wage-setters would react to the central. ideas of several economic theories of wage stickiness. Wage cuts were surprisingly prevalent in recent years, despite the booming economy. The strongest finding was that managers believe that perceptions of fairness play a major motivational role in labor markets; and that a "fair" wage policy is a good deal more complicated than simply not cutting wages. We also found substantial evidence for money illusion and against the adverse-selection version of the efficiency wage model.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w3105

Published: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.55, No.issue 4, pp.1003-1015, November 1990. citation courtesy of

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