NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness

Alan S. Blinder, Don H. Choi

NBER Working Paper No. 3105*
Issued in September 1989
NBER Program(s):   EFG

A small interview survey was undertaken to see how actual wage-setters

would react to the central. ideas of several economic theories of wage

stickiness. Wage cuts were surprisingly prevalent in recent years, despite

the booming economy. The strongest finding was that managers believe that

perceptions of fairness playa major motivational role in labor markets; and

that a "fair" wage policy is a good deal more complicated than simply not

cutting wages. We also found substantial evidence for money illusion and

against the adverse-selection version of the efficiency wage model.

*Published: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.55, No.issue 4, pp.1003-1015, November 1990.

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