TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kaplow,Louis
TI  - Incentives and Government Relief for Risk
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3007
PY  - 1991
Y2  - August 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3007
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3007.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Louis Kaplow
Harvard University
Hauser 322
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-4101
Fax: 617/496-4880
E-Mail: meskridge@law.harvard.edu
AB  - Government relief is offered for a wide range of risks - - natural disaster, economic dislocation, sickness and injury. This paper explores the effect of such relief on incentives and the allocation of risk in a model with private insurance. It is shown that government relief is inefficient, even when its level is less than the private insurance coverage that individuals would otherwise have purchased and even when private insurance coverage is incomplete due to problems of moral hazard.
ER  -