TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kaplow,Louis
AU  - Shavell,Steven
TI  - Legal Advice about Acts Already Commited
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3005
PY  - 1991
Y2  - March 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3005
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3005.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Louis Kaplow
Harvard University
Hauser 322
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-4101
Fax: 617/496-4880
E-Mail: meskridge@law.harvard.edu

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-3668
Fax: 617/496-2256
E-Mail: shavell@law.harvard.edu
AB  - Much legal advice is provided after individuals have committed acts -- when they come before a tribunal -- rather than at the time they decide how to act. This paper considers the effects and social desirability of such legal advice. It is emphasized that 1egl advice tends to reduce expected sanctions, which may encourage acts subject to sanctions. There is, however, no a priort basis for believing that this is socially undesirable, because, among other reasons, it may be possible to raise the level of sanctions to offset their dilution due to legal advice. In addition, legal advice has no general tendency to improve the effectiveness of the legal system through its influence on the information presented to tribunals.
ER  -