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Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell
NBER Working Paper No. 3005 (Also Reprint No. r1548)*
Issued in March 1991
NBER Program(s): LE
---- Abstract -----
Much legal advice is provided after individuals have committed acts --
when they come before a tribunal -- rather than at the time they decide how to
act. This paper considers the effects and social desirability of such legal
advice. It is emphasized that 1egl advice tends to reduce expected
sanctions, which may encourage acts subject to sanctions. There is, however,
no a priort basis for believing that this is socially undesirable, because,
among other reasons, it may be possible to raise the level of sanctions to
offset their dilution due to legal advice. In addition, legal advice has no
general tendency to improve the effectiveness of the legal system through its
influence on the information presented to tribunals.
*Published: International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 149-159, (19 90).
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