NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?

Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny

NBER Working Paper No. 3000
Issued in June 1989
NBER Program(s):   ME

This paper documents for a sample of 327 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987 three forces that systematically reduce the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad acquisitions.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w3000

Published: Journal of Finance, March 1990. citation courtesy of

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