NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants

John Bound

NBER Working Paper No. 2816 (Also Reprint No. r1260)
Issued in 1989
NBER Program(s):   LS

Applicants for Social Security Disability Benefits who fail to pass the medical screening form a natural 'control' group for beneficiaries. Data drawn from the 1972 and 1978 surveys of the disabled done for the Social Security Administration show that fewer than 50% of rejected male applicants work. Typical earnings of those that do are less than 50% of median earnings for other men their age. These data cast doubt on recent econometric work which suggests that the disincentive effects of DI have been substantial.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w2816

Published: The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 3, pp. 482-503, (June 1989). citation courtesy of

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