NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation

Raquel Fernandez, David Kaaret

NBER Working Paper No. 2704
Issued in September 1988
NBER Program(s):   ITI   IFM

This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w2704

Published: International Economic Review, February, 1992.

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