TY  - JOUR
AU  - Abowd,John M.
AU  - Tracy,Joseph S.
TI  - Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2595
PY  - 1988
Y2  - June 1988
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2595
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2595.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
John M. Abowd
School of Industrial and Labor Relations
261 Ives Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853
Tel: 607/255-8024
Fax: 866/873-9078
E-Mail: John.Abowd@cornell.edu

Joseph Tracy
Executive Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
Tel: 212/720-6344
E-Mail: joseph.tracy@ny.frb.org
AB  - We attempt a synthesis of the industrial relations market structure hypothesis with the modern asymmetric information theory of wage and strike outcomes The industrial relations literature contains a variety of arguments indicating that wage settlements should be positively related to the degree of product market sales concentration and the degree of product market coverage by the union. An asymmetric information bargaining model is specified that relates these same variables to strike probabilities as well as wage settlements. Our empirical analysis is conducted for :he periods from 1970-1380 (strikes) and 1976-1980 (wages). We find that the relation between trade-adjusted sales concentration and wage settlements is positive at low levels of concentration but negative at high levels of concentration. The relation is always negative for strike probabilities. We also find that the relation between the trade-adjusted percent of the product market covered by the same union and the percentage covered by other union are positively related to both wage settlements and strike probabilities. Our empirical analysis includes a rich set of controls including unrestricted time and industry effects, which do not affect the major conclusions.
ER  -