TY  - JOUR
AU  - Poterba,James M.
AU  - Rotemberg,Julio J.
TI  - Inflation And Taxation With Optimizing Governments
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2567
PY  - 1990
Y2  - April 1990
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2567
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2567.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James M. Poterba
Department of Economics
MIT, E52-350
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA  02142-1347
Tel: 617/253-6673
Fax: 617/258-7804
E-Mail: poterba@nber.org

Julio J. Rotemberg
Graduate School of Business
Harvard University, Morgan Hall
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA  02163
Tel: 617/495-1015
Fax: 617/496-5994
E-Mail: jrotemberg@hbs.edu
AB  - This paper extends and evaluates previous work on the positive theory of inflation. We examine the behavior of governments concerned solely with minimizing the deadweight loss from raising revenue through inflation and tax finance. We show that both governments that can commit to future policy actions, as well as those that cannot precommit, will choose a positive contemporaneous association between inflation and the level of tax burdens. We examine the empirical validity of this prediction using data from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Inflation and tax rates are as likely to be negatively as positively correlated, so the results cast doubt on the empirical relevance of simple models in which governments with time-invariant tastes choose monetary policy to equate the marginal deadweight burdens of inflation and taxes.
ER  -