Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries
|
NBER Working Paper No. 2519
Issued in February 1988
NBER Program(s): ITI IFM
Under GATT, countries are allowed to impose countervailing duties to offset foreign subsidies. However GATT rules limit the amount of duty to the amount of the subsidy. This paper examines a generalized model of imperfect competition with capital subsidies and shows the conditions under which a countervailing duty will offset the effect of the subsidy on exports. Also, conditions are specified under which exports will increase despite the imposition of the maximum tariff under GATT. In addition, the paper considers whether profit shifting motives for a subsidy still exist even when this maximum duty is anticipated.
Published: Spencer, Barbara J. "Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of International Economics, vol. 25, no. 1/2, pp 217-234. August 1988.
This paper is available as PDF (454 K) or DjVu (370 K) (Download viewer) or via email.
Machine-readable bibliographic record -
MARC,
RIS,
BibTeX
|
|
|
About
Support
The research activities of the NBER are funded by grants from federal research agencies, by private foundations, and by generous donations from our corporate associates and from private individuals. The NBER is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization. For information on supporting the NBER, please contact:
Mr. Denis Healy, Director of Development
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138-5398
ph: 617-868-3900
email: dhealy@nber.org
Close
