TY  - JOUR
AU  - Scotchmer,Suzanne
AU  - Slemrod,Joel
TI  - Randomness in Tax Enforcement
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2512
PY  - 1988
Y2  - February 1988
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2512
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2512.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Suzanne Scotchmer
Department of Economics
Evans Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA  94720-3880
Tel: 510/643-8562
Fax: 510/643-9657
E-Mail: scotch@berkeley.edu

Joel Slemrod
University of Michigan Business School
701 Tappan Street
Room R5396
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1234
Tel: 734/936-3914
Fax: 734-615-4323
E-Mail: jslemrod@umich.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 1988-05-01
AB  - For most parameter values, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess leads to higher reported income and more revenue, When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable Income. Even if reducing randomness g costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government a revenue stays fixed. These results do not rely on the presence of a distortion in labor supply.
ER  -