Institutional Investors and Information Acquisition: Implications for Asset Prices and Informational Efficiency
NBER Working Paper No. 23561
We jointly model the information choice and portfolio allocation problem of institutional investors who are concerned about their performance relative to a benchmark. Benchmarking increases an investor's effective risk-aversion, which reduces his willingness to speculate and, consequently, his desire to acquire information. In equilibrium, an increase in the fraction of benchmarked institutional investors leads to a decline in price informativeness, which can cause a decline in the prices of all risky assets and the market portfolio. The decline in price informativeness also leads to a substantial increase in return volatilities and allows non-benchmarked investors to substantially outperformed benchmarked investors.
You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w23561
Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these: