TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dickens,William T.
AU  - Katz,Lawrence F.
AU  - Lang,Kevin
AU  - Summers,Lawrence H.
TI  - Employee Crime, Monitoring, and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2356
PY  - 1989
Y2  - November 1989
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2356
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2356.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
William Dickens
School of Public Affairs
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland  20742-1821
Tel: 301 405-3494
E-Mail: wtdickens@gmail.com

Lawrence F. Katz
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-5148
Fax: 617/613-1245
E-Mail: lkatz@harvard.edu

Kevin Lang
Department of Economics
Boston University
270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA  02215
Tel: 617/353-5694
Fax: 617/353-4001
E-Mail: lang@bu.edu

Lawrence H. Summers
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-9322
Fax: 617/495-0436
E-Mail: lhs@harvard.edu
AB  - This paper offers some observations on employee crime, economic theories of crime, limits on bonding, and the efficiency wage hypothesis. We demonstrate that the simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring and large penalties for employee crime. Finding overwhelming empirical evidence that firms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance and do not impose extremely large penalties, we investigate a number of possible reasons why the simple model's predictions fail. It turns out that plausible explanations for firms large outlays on monitoring of employees also justify the payment of premium wages in some circumstances. There is no legitimate a priori argument that firms should not pay efficiency wages once it is recognized that they expend significant resources on monitoring.
ER  -