NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting

Josh Lerner, Haris Tabakovic, Jean Tirole

NBER Working Paper No. 22768
Issued in October 2016
NBER Program(s):Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship

A key role of standard setting organizations (SSOs) is to aggregate information on relevant intellectual property (IP) claims before deciding on a standard. This article explores the firms’ strategies in response to IP disclosure requirements—in particular, the choice between specific and generic disclosures of IP—and the optimal response by SSOs, including the royalty rate setting. We show that firms with a stronger downstream presence are more likely to opt for a generic disclosure, as are those with lower quality patents. We empirically examine patent disclosures made to seven large SSOs, and find results consistent with theoretical predictions.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w22768

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