Inattention and Switching Costs as Sources of Inertia in Medicare Part D
NBER Working Paper No. 22765
---- Acknowledgements ----
An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title, “Plan switching and inertia in Medicare Part D: Evidence from administrative data.” This research was funded by the Behavioral and Social Research program of the National Institute on Aging (grants P01AG05842-18, P01AG033559, R56AG026622-01A1, and RC4AG039036), with additional support from the E. Morris Cox Fund at the University of California, Berkeley. We gratefully acknowledge comments by, and discussions with, Eric French, Ben Handel, Maria Polyakova, and Justin Sydnor, participants at the 2014 AEA meetings in Philadelphia, the 2014 ASHEcon conference in Los Angeles, the 2014 CESifo Conference on Behavioral Economics in Munich, the 2014 CEAR/MRIC Behavioral Insurance Workshop in Munich, the 2014 German Health Econometrics Workshop in Wuppertal, the 2015 NBER Summer Institute, the 2015 Workshop on Policyholder Behavior at ETH Zurich, the 2016 EuHEA meetings in Hamburg, as well as seminar audiences at cemmap/UCL, DIW Berlin, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, and the universities of Copenhagen, Essex, Leuven, Lugano, Lund, Regensburg, St. Gallen, Wuppertal, Wurzburg, and Zurich. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.