NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling

Benjamin B. Bederson, Ginger Zhe Jin, Phillip Leslie, Alexander J. Quinn, Ben Zou

NBER Working Paper No. 22710
Issued in October 2016
NBER Program(s):   IO

In 2011, Maricopa County, Arizona adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspections results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58% of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse As and better Bs use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants.

You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.

Access to NBER Papers

You are eligible for a free download if you are a subscriber, a corporate associate of the NBER, a journalist, an employee of the U.S. federal government with a ".GOV" domain name, or a resident of nearly any developing country or transition economy.

If you usually get free papers at work/university but do not at home, you can either connect to your work VPN or proxy (if any) or elect to have a link to the paper emailed to your work email address below. The email address must be connected to a subscribing college, university, or other subscribing institution. Gmail and other free email addresses will not have access.

E-mail:

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w22710

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Ehrlich w0018 The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death
Krugman w1752 Increasing Returns and the Theory of International Trade
Bianchi and Bigio w20490 Banks, Liquidity Management and Monetary Policy
Falato and Scharfstein w22689 The Stock Market and Bank Risk-Taking
Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Mahoney, and Song w22711 Bad Credit, No Problem? Credit and Labor Market Consequences of Bad Credit Reports
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us