NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Optimal Domestic (and External) Sovereign Default

Pablo D'Erasmo, Enrique G. Mendoza

NBER Working Paper No. 22509
Issued in August 2016
NBER Program(s):International Finance and Macroeconomics

Infrequent but turbulent episodes of outright sovereign default on domestic creditors are considered a “forgotten history” in Macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors are driven by distributional incentives and endogenous default costs due to the value of debt for self-insurance, liquidity and risk-sharing. The government's aim to redistribute resources across agents and through time in response to uninsurable shocks produces a rich dynamic feedback mechanism linking debt issuance, the distribution of government bond holdings, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Spanish data, the model is consistent with key cyclical co-movements and features of debt-crisis dynamics. Debt exhibits protracted fluctuations. Defaults have a low frequency of 0.93 percent, are preceded by surging debt and spreads, and occur with relatively low external debt. Default risk limits the sustainable debt and yet spreads are zero most of the time.

download in pdf format
   (605 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w22509

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan, and Jansen w13932 Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Brunnermeier and Sannikov w22533 The I Theory of Money
Dordal-i-Carreras, Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland w22510 Infrequent but Long-Lived Zero-Bound Episodes and the Optimal Rate of Inflation
Prescott and Wessel w22431 Monetary Policy with 100 Percent Reserve Banking: An Exploration
Cochrane w22485 Macro-Finance
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us