@techreport{NBERw2239,
 title = "A Generic Model of Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Reputation",
 author = "Herschel I. Grossman",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "2239",
 year = "1990",
 month = "August",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w2239",
 abstract = {This paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium for inflation under the generic assumption that monetary policy reflects proximate preferences for low expected inflation and positive unexpected inflation. The paper stresses the qualitative implication that in a reputational equilibrium the policymaker behaves as if it is concerned about controlling inflation, even though it does not have a direct preference for a low actual inflation rate. The analysis also shows how the sovereign's prospects for survival and the private agents' memory process play critical roles in determining whether the reputational equilibrium approximates a hypothetical equilibrium with binding commitments.},
}