NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile

W. Bentley MacLeod, Teck Yong Tan

NBER Working Paper No. 22156
Issued in April 2016

---- Acknowledgements ----

We would like to thank Bob Gibbons, Bengt Holmström, Stephen Morris and seminar participants at MIT and the Econometric Society meetings, San Francisco, 2016 for helpful comments. We also thank Elliot Ash for research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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