NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Negotiator Behavior Under Arbitration

David E. Bloom, Christopher L. Cavanagh

NBER Working Paper No. 2211
Issued in March 1987
NBER Program(s):   LS

The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has focused primarily on the behavior of arbitrators under alternative forms of arbitration. This article suggests that it is natural for empirical economists to now expand their focus to include issues related to the behavior of negotiators. In this connection, three key aspects of negotiator behavior are discussed: (1) the decision to settle a dispute voluntarily or to proceed to arbitration; (2) the strategy for selecting an arbitrator; and (3) the final bargaining position to advance before an arbitrator.

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Published: Bloom, David E. and Christopher L. Cavanagh. "Negotiator Behavior Under Arbitration," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1987, pp. 3 53-358.

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