NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Net Neutrality, Pricing Instruments and Incentives

Joshua S. Gans, Michael L. Katz

NBER Working Paper No. 22040
Issued in February 2016
NBER Program(s):Industrial Organization, Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship

We correct and extend the results of Gans (2015) regarding the effects of net neutrality regulation on equilibrium outcomes in settings where a content provider sells its services to consumers for a fee. We examine both pricing and investment effects. We extend the earlier paper’s result that weak forms of net neutrality are ineffective and also show that even a strong form of net neutrality may be ineffective. In addition, we demonstrate that, when strong net neutrality does affect the equilibrium outcome, it may harm efficiency by distorting both ISP and content provider investment and service-quality choices.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w22040

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