NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Country Risk and the Organization of International Capital Transfer

Jonathan Eaton, Mark Gersovitz

NBER Working Paper No. 2204
Issued in March 1987
NBER Program(s):   ITI   IFM

Foreign portfolio investment is threatened by the risk of default and repudiation, while direct foreign investment is threatened by the risk of expropriation. These two contractual forms of investment can differ substantially in: (1) the amount of capital they can transfer from abroad to capital-importing countries; (2) the shadow cost of capital and (3) their implications for the tax policy of the host. The interaction of public borrowing from abroad with investments abroad by private citizens of the borrowing country can imply multiple equilibria with very different welfare consequences. One equilibrium involves private inflows and repayment of public debt. Another is characterized by capital flight and default.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w2204

Published: Calvo, G., R. Findlay, P. Kouri and J. deMacedo (eds.) Debt, Stabilization and Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

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