NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

On the Desirability of Capital Controls

Jonathan Heathcote, Fabrizio Perri

NBER Working Paper No. 21898
Issued in January 2016
NBER Program(s):Economic Fluctuations and Growth, International Finance and Macroeconomics

In a standard two country international macro model we ask whether imposing restrictions on international non-contingent borrowing and lending is ever desirable. The answer is yes. If one country imposes capital controls unilaterally, it can generate favorable changes in the dynamics of equilibrium interest rates and the terms of trade, and thereby benefit at the expense of its trading partner. If both countries simultaneously impose capital controls, the welfare effects are ambiguous. We identify calibrations in which symmetric capital controls improve terms of trade insurance against country specific shocks, and thereby increase welfare for both countries.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w21898

Published: Jonathan Heathcote & Fabrizio Perri, 2016. "On the Desirability of Capital Controls," IMF Economic Review, vol 64(1), pages 75-102. citation courtesy of

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