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The Political Economy of Government Debt

Alberto Alesina, Andrea Passalacqua

NBER Working Paper No. 21821
Issued in December 2015
NBER Program(s):Political Economy

This paper critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy. We also discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w21821

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