NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Macro-Economic Equilibrium and Credit Rationing

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss

NBER Working Paper No. 2164
Issued in 1987
NBER Program(s):   EFG

In this paper we investigate the macro-economic equilibria of an economy in which credit contracts have both adverse selection and incentive effects. The terms of credit contracts include both an interest rate and a collateral requirement. We show that in this richer model all types of borrowers may be rationed. Interest rates charged borrowers may move either pro or counter-cyclically. If pro-cyclical shocks have a greater effect on the success probabilities of risky techniques than on safe ones, then the interest rate offered depositors may also move counter-cyclically. Finally, we show that the impact of monetary policy on the macro-economic equilibrium is affected by whether or not the economy is in a regime in which credit is rationed.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w2164

Published: Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss. "Keynesian, New Keynesian and New Classical Econmics," Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 39, 1987, pp. 119-132.

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