TY  - JOUR
AU  - Polinsky,A. Mitchell
AU  - Rubinfeld,Daniel L.
TI  - A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2114
PY  - 1986
Y2  - December 1986
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2114
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2114.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305
Tel: 650/723-0886
Fax: 650/723-3557
E-Mail: polinsky@stanford.edu

Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law and
Professor of Economics Emeritus
788 Simon Tower, Boalt Hall
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
Tel: 510/642-1959
Fax: 510/642-3767
E-Mail: drubinfeld@law.berkeley.edu
AB  - This note reexamines the theory of optimal public enforcement when litigation costs are incurred if the defendant is prosecuted at trial, and when an out-of-court settlement is possible. Using a numerical example, it is shown that settlements and litigation costs can substantially alter the optimal system of public enforcement. It is also shown that failing to take these considerations into account can significantly lower the achievable level of social welfare.
ER  -