TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bulow,Jeremy I.
AU  - Rogoff,Kenneth
TI  - A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2088
PY  - 1987
Y2  - February 1987
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2088
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2088.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jeremy I. Bulow
Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
Stanford, CA  94305-7298
Tel: 650/723-2160
Fax: 650/725-8916
E-Mail: jbulow@stanford.edu

Kenneth S. Rogoff
Thomas D Cabot Professor of Public Policy
Economics Department
Harvard University
Littauer Center 216
Cambridge, MA 02138-3001
Tel: 617-495-4022
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: krogoff@harvard.edu
AB  - Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels. We derive a bargaining equilibrium in which countries with large debts achieve negotiated partial default. The ability to credibly threaten more draconian penalties in the event of repudiation may be of no benefit to lenders. Furthermore, unanticipated increases in world interest rates may actually help the borrowers by making lenders more inpatient for a negotiated settlement. Finally, Western governments may be induced to make payments to facilitate reschedulings even though efficient agreements will be reached without their intervention.
ER  -