Competition and Bank Opacity
NBER Working Paper No. 20760
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.
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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w20760
Published: Liangliang Jiang & Ross Levine & Chen Lin, 2016. "Competition and Bank Opacity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1911-1942. citation courtesy of
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