TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cooper,Russell
TI  - Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria:  A Framework for Analysis
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 2060
PY  - 1986
Y2  - October 1986
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2060
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2060.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Russell Cooper
Department of Economics
European University Institute
via della Piazzola, 43
Firenze, 50133
ITALY
E-Mail: russellcoop@gmail.com
AB  - This paper examines the macroeconomic properties of imperfectly competitive economies. The focus is on the coordination failures that might arise in these economies, a study of alternative policies and the comparative static properties of these models. This paper differs from others in this area by modeling the labor market from the perspective of optimal contract theory. This permits an evaluation of the role of labor market behavior in producing these coordination failures and a study of labor market policies (such as unemployment insurance and alternative compensation schemes).
ER  -