NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis

Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny

NBER Working Paper No. 2055
Issued in October 1986

We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as board of directors holdings rise. For older firms there is weak evidence that Q is lower when a firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w2055

Published: "Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis" Journal of Financial Economics, March, 1988

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