NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Frédéric Malherbe

NBER Working Paper No. 20417
Issued in August 2014
NBER Program(s):   POL

A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule with veto power (Veto) - that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in the EU institutions and could help to inform debates about policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w20417

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