NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental Evidence

Sebastian Galiani, Gustavo Torrens, Maria Lucia Yanguas

NBER Working Paper No. 19943
Issued in February 2014
NBER Program(s):   DEV

The Political Coase Theorem (PCT) states that, in the absence of transaction costs, agents should agree to implement efficient policies regardless of the distribution of bargaining power among them. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to explore how commitment problems undermine the validity of the PCT. Overall, the results support theoretical predictions. In particular, commitment issues matter, and the existence of more commitment possibilities leads to better social outcomes. Moreover, we find that the link is valid when commitment possibilities are asymmetrically distributed between players and even when a redistribution of political power is required to take advantage of those possibilities. However, we also find that at low levels of commitment there is more cooperation than strictly predicted by our parameterized model while the opposite is true at high levels of commitment, and only large improvements in commitment opportunities have a significant effect on the social surplus, while small changes do not.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w19943

Published: Galiani, Sebastian & Torrens, Gustavo & Yanguas, Maria Lucia, 2014. "The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 17-38. citation courtesy of

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