Experimentation in Federal Systems

Steven Callander, Bård Harstad

NBER Working Paper No. 19601
Issued in October 2013
NBER Program(s):   POL

We present a model where heterogeneous districts choose both whether to experiment and the policies to experiment with. Since districts learn from each other, the first-best requires that policy experiments converge so that innovations are useful also for neighbors. However, the equilibrium implies the reverse - policy divergence - since each district uses its policy choice to discourage free-riding. We then study a clumsy central government that harmonizes final policy choices. This progressive concentration of power induces a policy tournament that can increase the incentive to experiment and encourage policy convergence. We derive the best political regime as well as the optimal levels of heterogeneity, transparency, prizes, and intellectual property rights.

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Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w19601

Published: Steven Callande & BÃ¥rd Harstad, 2015. "Experimentation in Federal Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(2), pages 951-1002. citation courtesy of

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