NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Merit Pay for School Superintendents?

Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard P. Chaykowski, Randy A. Ehrenberg

NBER Working Paper No. 1954 (Also Reprint No. r1077)*
Issued in November 1988
NBER Program(s):   LS

Given the important role that school district administrators

play in the educational process, one might expect their

"performance" to be of fundamental importance in determining both

how much students learn and the cost of public education to

taxpayers. Yet, while public debate has considered the issue of

merit pay plans for teachers, virtually no attention has been

directed to the methods by which school administrators are

compensated.

This paper provides evidence on whether school superintendents

are explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their

"performance" by higher compensation and/or greater opportunities

for mobility. We analyze panel data from over 700 school

'districts in New Ycrk State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period.

Measures of performance are defined and then entered into salary

level, salary change, and mobility equations. While evidence is

provided that school superintendents are rewarded for

"performance", the magnitude of the rewards appear to be quite

small.

*Published: Ehrenberg, R.G., R.P. Chaykowski and R.A. Ehrenberg."Are School Superintendents Rewarded for Performance?" From Distributing Educational Resources Within Nations, States, School Districts, and Schools, edited by D. Monk, American Educational Finance Association Yearbook, 1988. "Determinants of the Compenstation and Mobility of School Superintendents" From Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol.41, No.3, pp. 386-401,(April 1988).

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